N o conversation about the science of language can get very far with out a mention of Steven Pinker, the Harvard University cognitive scientist who has not yet made linguistics as popular as football -but is working on it. In The Sense of Style, he wants to give us the cognitive science, linguistics and psychology behind classic debates over proper English, from passive voice to split infinitives.
Plenty of others have given us stuffy decrees intended to end the interminable wrangling, but Pinker is different. He is unhappy with the classic style manuals -including revered texts such as Strunk & White (William Strunk and E. B. White's The Elements of Style) or Fowler's Modern English Usage. We need a new guide "infused by the spirit of scientific skepticism", he writes, using grammar and research on "the mental dynamics of reading" to replace edicts with evidence. Pinker gave us the science in The Language Instinct (William Morrow, 1994) ; in The Sense of Style he sets out to offer its practical application.
He covers much of the same ground as the classic guides, including frequently mis used words ("fulsome" and "noisome") and the serial comma. His problem with Strunk & White, however, is that the authors lack tools for analysing language, and so end up "vainly appealing to the writer's 'ear'". That's on page two. By page three, he is challenging the manual's dismissal of the passive voice. Linguistic research, he later writes, has shown that the pas sive actually "allows the writer to direct the reader's gaze, like a cin ematographer choos ing the best camera angle". What research, exactly? Pinker does not tell us. His views are infor me d by psycho linguistics; that is his day job. But he promises us science, so I expected to see data. However, in this instance, and in many others, the data are not there.
Similarly, Pinker's view on infinitives is to split them "if you need to", a conclusion backed by dictionaries and style manualsnot research. And when he quotes with admi ration the opening line of Richard Dawkins' Unweaving the Rainbow (Houghton Mifflin, 1998) -"We are going to die, and that on scientists' expectation that the material world is composed of some kind of funda mental atoms of 'stuff ' . Quantum theory, however, has rewarded these endeavours with phantom particles that, like waves, can be both Thus we smile at the comical pronounce ments on physics by US actress Shirley MacLaine, until the authors point out that she could be paraphrasing similar pro nouncements made 55 years earlier by the British physicist James Jeans. I have else where argued that contemporary theoreti cal physics has become rather selfindulgent and selfreferential, a malaise that I have called fairytale physics. Deep questions about the nature of reality tend to provoke this kind of response, and it surely finds its origin in the quantum moment. ■ makes us the lucky ones" -he offers a detailed explanation of why it works that is, again, short on science.
Pinker is a good writer and a deeply humanistic one, and there are many bright moments here. His lists explain ing right and wrong usage with a range of examples (enervate means to sap, not energize) are a useful desk reference. Among numerous good tips is one on, as Pinker has it, "the compulsion to name things with different words when they are mentioned multiple times". "Herons are herons, " he writes, not "longlegged waders, azure airborne aviators, or sap phire sentinels of the sky".
At W hat of that ultimate existential question, the meaning of life? Aristotle saw it as the achieve ment of happiness. UK comedy troupe Monty Python suggested that it involves reading "a good book every now and then". In The Meaning of Human Existence, biolo gist E. O. Wilson offers a good book that adds to such prescriptions, but readers seek ing a sense of purpose will be disappointed. What Wilson is after is really a deeper under standing of human existence.
Still, there can be few better guides through our species' past journey and potential for the future. Wilson provides the literary equivalent of a greatesthits album, giving us a pithy synthesis of his formidable body of work from Sociobiology (Harvard University Press, 1975) to The Social Conquest of Earth (Liveright, 2012) , with a lib eral dose of Consilience (Little, Brown, 1998) . The result is a provocative and beautifully written collection of essays, although one that struggles to be more than the sum of its parts.
In the opening section, Wilson intro duces his central premise that humans, like his beloved ants, are eusocial animals. Some individuals reduce their own lifetime repro ductive potential so that they can raise the offspring of others (think of grandmothers after meno pause). Key to the origin of euso ciality is the creation of a nest, from which some of the population undertake risky for aging while the remainder stay safe at home. Wilson argues that our unique intelligence began to evolve when our ancestors tamed fire to cook, settled around the campsite and sent a fraction of the group off to risk life and limb hunting down energyrich meat.
Thus began a tension between acting for ourselves and acting for our group, which Wilson argues is at the heart of our conflicted human nature. Here he parts company with most evolutionary theorists, revisiting an already acrimonious debate (aired in Nature) over the origin of euso cial traits. Wilson originally supported evolutionary biolo gist W. D. Hamilton's theory of inclusive fitness, in which the costs of altruism can be rationalized if they are outweighed by the product of the ben efits to recipients and the recipients' relat edness to the altruist. But in 2010, he and some colleagues rejected it (M. A. Nowak et al. Nature 466, 1057 -1062 2010) . In its place, they argued for a mixture of individual and grouplevel selection.
Back from the firmly prodded ants' nest of evolutionary theorists came a predictably forceful defence (see, for example, P. Abbot et al. Nature 471, E1-E4; 2011), but Wilson remains unmoved by this stinging riposte. The frustration for the neutral reader is that both sides agree that the gene is the funda mental unit of selection, so the squabble is over different flavours of standard evolu tionary theory. Neither side seems to see the Pythonesque irony of fighting over how to understand cooperation. Still, nothing could better demonstrate the tribal nature of humanity, which provides a focus for the rest of the book.
Wilson's enthusiasm for a mixture of individual and grouplevel selection goes further, as he struggles to resist an "over simplistic" portrayal that "individual selec tion promoted sin, while group selection promoted virtue". The inconsistency in this
